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To whom does a professional owe a duty of care when providing
professional services?1 The traditional answer, grounded in principles of
contractual privity, is that professionals are liable for negligence to their
clients, and perhaps to third-party beneficiaries of the client-professional
relationship, but that their noncontractual obligations generally extend no
further than a duty not to commit fraud.2 In the past two decades, however,
courts have become increasingly willing to hold a wide range of professionals
liable for their negligence to parties outside the chain of privity.3 The
accompanying growth of third-party4 lawsuits alleging professional negligence,
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1 The distinction between "professions" and other occupations seems to reflect the
hubris of self-described professionals more than any underlying economic reality. The cases
we examine, however, treat professionals-such as accountants, architects, attorneys, and
engineers-as a distinct class of persons. We accordingly accede to that practice.
2 Note, Privity Requirenent for Attorney Liability to Nonclients, 4 ST. JOHN'S J.L.
CONMENTARY 321, 321 n. 1 (1989) (authored by Melinda R. Katz).
3 See Donnelly Constr. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 139 Ariz. 184, 677 P.2d 1292
(1984) (holding architects liable for professional negligence to foreseeable nonclient
victims); Wolther v. Schaarschmidt, 738 P.2d 25 (Colo. App. 1986) (holding that a
nonclient purchaser had a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation against an
engineer who conducted a walk-through investigation of a house).
4 For purposes of our analysis, "third parties" are persons who are neither in direct
contractual privity nor in some functionally equivalent relationship with the defendant
professionals. In particular, we somewhat idiosyncratically treat suits brought by third-party
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and in particular alleging negligent misrepresentation by accountants or
attorneys, raises serious questions for professionals concerning their legal and
ethical obligations to nonclients.
These recent changes in liability standards have not been uniform across
professions. Specifically, accountants have thus far seen their liability to third
parties for negligent misrepresentation expand far more rapidly than have
attorneys. 5 There are strong indications, however, that the attorneys are
making up some ground-no doubt more quickly than they would like. One
modem court, in permitting a third-party suit against an architect for
negligently preparing engineering site specifications, "expressly
disapprove[d] ... blanket denials of causes of action" 6 by third parties against
professionals in general, with specific reference to suits against attorneys for
negligent misrepresentation. 7 Another court, in finding an accountant
answerable to a third party for negligent misrepresentation, declared even more
directly that "[w]e doubt the wisdom of continuing to apply different standards
for determining the liability of different professionals to third parties."8
These sweeping judicial pronouncements should be of great interest to
attorneys. There is good reason to believe that the relatively benign treatment
now typically enjoyed by attorneys in third-party lawsuits is primarily, if not
entirely, the consequence of an enduring, carefully cultivated image of the
lawyer as a faithful fiduciary, zealously guarding his client's interests even at
the expense of the broader public. Unsympathetic court statements, 9 however,
may reflect a growing shift in the legal system's perception of the lawyer's
professional role. There has definitely been such a change in the perceived
professional role of accountants and it has been a major factor in the modem
expansion of accountants' third-party liability. If the disparate treatment
currently afforded accountants and attorneys in third-party lawsuits is the
product of differing role conceptions, and if the legal system's views of lawyers
and accountants are starting to converge, a significant expansion of attorney
liability may not be far off. Admittedly, similar predictions have been made in
beneficiaries of contracts and, if necessary, suits by intended beneficiaries of wills, as first-
party rather than third-party actions. See infra note 44.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 40-74.
6 Donnelly, 139 Ariz. at 188, 677 P.2d at 1296.
7 See id. The court in Donnelly rejected a prior decision of the Arizona Court of
Appeals that declined "to grant a cause of action for [negligent misrepresentation] to an
individual who [was] not a client or in privity with the attorney." Chalpin v. Brennan, 114
Ariz. 124, 126, 559 P.2d 680, 682 (1976)).
8 Blue Bell, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 715 S.W.2d 408, 413 (rex. Ct.
App. 1986).
9 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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the past two decades with little success, 10 but more recent legal developments
suggest that it is time to examine them anew.1
This Article presents a descriptive and predictive analysis of the third-party
liability of accountants and attorneys for negligent misrepresentation. 12 By way
of background, Part I describes the activities of each profession that seem most
frequently to expose practitioners to third-party claims of negligent
misrepresentation, and Part II sketches the various legal standards applied by
courts in assessing such claims and the trends in the law that have emerged
over the last two decades. Part II provides our substantive analysis in four
sections. The first section sets forth the reasons most often advanced by courts
for adopting standards that expand the liability of accountants or attorneys
beyond the chain of privity. The second section explores whether those reasons
portend a narrowing of the existing difference in third-party liability standards
that are applied to the two professions. The third section recounts an aborted
attempt by the Securities and Exchange Commission in the 1970s to redefine
radically the lawyer's role in securities transactions, which holds valuable, if
ambiguous, lessons for both attorneys and accountants faced with the prospect
of expanding third-party liability. Finally, the fourth section concludes that the
thread separating the two professions' third-party tort liability is thin and
fraying. 13 Thus, lawyers should seriously contemplate the possibility that they
may be the targets of the next rash of third-party lawsuits against
professionals-after the accountants, architects, and engineers have been
adequately bashed. As one commentator noted:
Enter a small irony: Actions against accountants are filed by lawyers, who by
winning create a climate receptive to the abandonment of privity in claims
10 See Hilliker, Attorney Liability to 7bird Parties: A Look to te Future, 36 DE PAUL
L. REV. 41, 66 (1986); Note, Public Accountants and Attorneys: Negligence and the Third
Party, 47 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 588, 588 (1972).
11 Or, as Bullwinkle once said to Rocky: "This time for sure!"
12 While we make occasional references to the liability of other professionals, our
study formally encompasses only accountants and attorneys. More significantly, our study is
strictly confined to the common-law tort of negligent misrepresentation. See infra text
accompanying notes 33-34. We do not directly address, for example, the potential liability
of professionals for other torts, common-law fraud, or violations of state or federal
securities laws.
13 We do not discuss whether the thread should be rewoven or allowed to fray further.
If we did, we would strongly endorse the traditional privity standard for both accountants
and attorneys, in part for reasons that have been well stated elsewhere. See Goldberg,
Accountable Accountants: Is 77tird-Party Liability Necessary?, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 295
(1988); Gossman, The Fallacy of Expanding Accountants' Liability, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 213; Lawson & Olson, Caveat Auditor: Yhe Rise of Accountants' Liability, CLAIMS,
Apr. 1990, at 34; Note, Expanding Legal Malpractice to Nonclient 77idrd Parties-At What
Cost?, 23 COLUM. I.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 1 (1989) (authored by Douglas A. Cifu).
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against all professionals, themselves included. For although accountants and
lawyers sell clients different skills, the services of either, if performed
negligently or fraudulently, can work great harm to others.14
I. HOW ACCOUNTANTS AND ATrORNEYS GET INTO TROUBLE
Accountants and attorneys are often intimately involved in their clients'
financial transactions by providing counsel, preparing or assisting in the
preparation of documents, and offering opinions on the need for and sufficiency
of financial or legal disclosure. The resulting documents and opinions they
generate are then frequently distributed, possibly without the professional's
knowledge, to third-party creditors and investors. If the circulated material is
erroneous or misleading as a result of the professional's negligence, injured
third parties who relied on that material' 5 may assert a cause of action for
negligent misrepresentation against the professional. A brief look at the
transactional roles of accountants and attorneys provides a useful framework
for examining the emergent pattern of third-party liability for the two
professions.
A. The Transactional Role of Accountants
For parties contemplating participating in business transactions, knowledge
is power. Because companies are not always the most trustworthy sources of
financial information about themselves, prospective lenders, investors, or
customers will frequently insist upon audited financial statements before dealing
with the company. 16 Thus, both to satisfy outside parties and for purposes of
their own internal management, companies typically must engage an outside
accountant.
14 Gilers, Ethics that Bite: Lawyers' Liability to 77ird Parties, 13 LrIGATION, Winter
1987, at 8.
15 We assume throughout this Article that reliance is a necessary element of a
negligent misrepresentation claim. See, e.g., Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104,
1131 (5th Cir. 1988) (applying Louisiana law), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 918 (1989); Raritan
River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 322 N.C. 200, 206, 367 S.E.2d 609, 612
(1988).
16 Regulatory agencies may also demand the production of audited financial
statements. For example, the Securities Act of 1933 prohibits a wide range of transactions
with respect to a security unless a registration statement has been filed as to such security.
15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1990). Schedule A of the Act, which regulates the content of most
registration statements, requires the inclusion of audited financial information. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(e) schedule A (25), (26).
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The two most important services provided by the accountant are an audit of
the client's accounting books and procedures17 and the issuance of an opinion
discussing whether the client's financial statements have been prepared in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). 18 Although
the accountant may be heavily involved in preparing financial statements, the
statements themselves, unlike the accountant's opinion concerning them, are
formally the representations of the client's management rather than of the
accountant. 19
The accounting profession's self-governing body, the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), 20 has established a set of generally
17 Fundamentally, an audit is an examination of a company's financial position,
transactions, and internal accounting practices over a specified period of time. It will
typically involve a review of representative samples of such important items as a company's
cash holdings and accounts receivable, other assets and liabilities, major contracts and
documents, minutes of board of directors' meetings, and internal accounting control
procedures. See generally Hagen, Certified Public Accountants' Liability for Malpractice:
Effect of Compliance with GAAP and GAAS, 13 J. CONTEMP. L. 66-67 (1987).
18 GAAP are guidelines that reflect
the consensus at a particular time as to which economic resources and obligations
should be recorded as assets and liabilities by financial accounting, which changes in
assets and liabilities should be recorded, when these changes should be recorded, how
the assets and liabilities and changes in them should be measured, what information
should be disclosed and how it should be disclosed, and which financial statements
should be prepared.
3 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AC § 1026.01 (1979).
19 Although an accountant's principal tasks are auditing and opinion writing, 1 AICPA
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AU § 110.01 (1989) [hereinafter PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS], public accountants also perform such functions as reviews or compilations of
clients' financial statements, tax counseling and compliance work, and management and
financial consulting. Judging from the reported decisions, however, these functions rarely
give rise to third-party negligent misrepresentation suits. In review engagements, the
accountants perform only limited tests and inquiries to provide themselves with "a
reasonable basis for expressing limited assurance that there are no material modifications
that must be made to the financial statements." 2 id. at AR § 100.04. In compilation
engagements, accountants limit their responsibility solely to the actual compilation of the
financial statements. They do not assert that the financial statements conform to GAAP or
that an audit or review of the client's financial books was performed. Id. Consequently, in
both review and compilation engagements, accountants will make it clear that they did not
perform an independent audit, which may render it unreasonable for users of financial
statements to place substantial reliance on the accountants' statements. Counseling and
financial consulting activities are even less likely to be the subjects of third-party negligent
misrepresentation lawsuits.
20 Ile AICPA is a private organization whose stated objectives are:
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accepted auditing standards (GAAS), with which member accountants must
comply when conducting audits. Violations of GAAS may result in
professional disciplinary actions. 21 Within the broad parameters established by
GAAS, the accountant has substantial discretion in determining the nature of
the specific audit steps and tests to be performed. 22 The procedures employed
must be designed to provide reasonable assurance that material errors and
irregularities will be detected. Nonetheless, the auditor is not required actively
to search for and locate such errors or fraud. 23 Significantly, however, the
auditor must maintain a stance of independence from the client, who is likely to
be financially interested in receiving as favorable an audit opinion as
possible.24
Although the accountant routinely is exposed to sensitive and confidential
financial information concerning the client, the accountant's work product,
unlike an attorney's work product, is not protected by common-law evidentiary
mo unite certified public accountants in the United States; to promote and maintain
high professional standards of practice; to assist in the maintenance of standards for
entry to the profession; to promote the interests of CPA's; to develop and improve
accounting education; and to encourage cordial relations between CPA's and
professional accountants in other countries.
2 Id. at BL § 101.01. The AICPA oversees the activities of public accountants in the
performance of their duties and is responsible for disciplining members of the profession for
not following professional standards.
21 In general, GAAS require that accountants have adequate training and proficiency
as auditors, that they be independent in the performance of audit duties, and that they
conduct those duties with due professional care. Id. at AU § 150.02. Statements of auditing
standards (SAS), which are detailed interpretations of the GAAS regarding specific features
of an audit, are also frequently referred to as GAAS. See A. ARENS & J. LOEBBECKE,
AUDrrNG: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 17 (4th ed. 1988).
22
A typical audit involves five essential steps. First, the auditor must plan the
audit .... Second, the auditor must make a preliminary evaluation of the client's
internal accounting control system. Third, the auditor must conduct compliance tests to
determine whether that control system is functioning properly. Fourth, the auditor must
evaluate the audit program and modify it to conform to the results of the compliance
tests. Finally, the auditor must evaluate the information obtained and issue a report (an
"opinion") stating whether the client's financial statements accurately reflect the
financial position of the enterprise.
Gossman, supra note 13, at 213.
23 See PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 19, at AU § 316.
24 Id. at AU § 220.
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privileges.2 This gap has been partially closed by statutes, which protect
accountant-client communications "in perhaps a third of the states." 26
If the auditor has received all needed data and has concluded that the
financial statements fairly conform with GAAP, the auditor will issue a "clean"
or "unqualified" audit opinion.27 A clean audit opinion from a reputable public
accounting firm can be a valuable asset to a firm and a burdensome liability to
the accountant. If the audit report is clean but a plaintiff's attorney can credibly
argue that the financial statements are incomplete or misleading, the accountant
becomes a potential target of a negligent misrepresentation suit by disgruntled
creditors or investors who obtained and relied upon the information.
B. The Transactional Role of Attorneys
Like accountants, attorneys often are deeply involved in their clients'
financial transactions. 28 The attorney's most visible transactional role is likely
to be providing a formal opinion regarding the legality of proposed
transactions-such as mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, and public
offerings or private placements of securities. The attorney, however, will also
often bear functional but not formal responsibility for the preparation or review
of transactional and disclosure documents. For example, if the client is
contemplating a public offering of securities that must be registered under state
or federal securities laws, the attorney may be the principal drafter of the
25 See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 815-18 (1984); 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2286 (MeNaughton rev. 1961 &
Supp. 1991).
26 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 76.2 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). Accountants are also
subject to an ethical obligation of nondisclosure. See AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCr Rule 301 (1988).
27 B. LEFKowrrz, UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 39 (1979). An
accountant can also issue three other types of audit reports. An adverse opinion is used in
the rare cases when the auditor has affirmative knowledge that the overall financial
statements are so materially misstated or misleading that they do not fairly present the
company's financial position. A disclaimer of opinion is issued when the accountant,
because of a severe limitation on the permitted scope of her examination or the absence of a
proper relationship of independence from the client, is unable to satisfy herself that the
overall financial statements are fairly presented. A qualified report can issue when the
accountant affirmatively believes that the overall financial statements are fairly presented
but that there has been a limitation on the scope of the audit or a failure to follow GAAP.
See A. ARENS & J. LOEBBECKE, supra note 21, at 43-44.
28 See generally Block, An Overview: Responsibilities of Attorneys Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 36 BUS. LAw. 1781, 1781 (1981); Frank, A Higher Duty: A New Look at
the Ethics of the Corporate Lawyer, 26 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 337, 339-40 (1977); Report by
Special Committee on Lawyers' Role in Securities Transactions, 32 BUs. LAW. 1879,
1884-86 (1977).
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registration statement and other relevant documents. The attorney may also be
asked by the client-more precisely, by the client's officers or directors-to
perform a due diligence investigation to ascertain the accuracy and
completeness of the information contained in the registration statement. 29
Similar procedures might well be employed in unregistered transactions to
satisfy the concerns or demands of interested parties.
Although an attorney's due diligence investigation 30 and an accountant's
audit are superficially similar, they have notable differences. First, information
acquired by attorneys from their clients in the course of their duties universally
is subject to evidentiary privileges. 31 Second, investigating attorneys are not
subject to, and do not have the benefit of, a detailed set of authoritative
operational guidelines equivalent to GAAS. Third, the scope and purposes of
an audit and a due diligence investigation differ in a somewhat paradoxical
way. An accountant must maintain a stance of independence from the client,
but is not obliged, or always inclined, to structure the audit actively to search
for errors or fraud.32 An attorney, in contrast, has an ethical obligation to
29 Due diligence is a defense available to defendants other than the issuer of securities
in suits under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1988).
Nonexperts who are subject to liability under the statute-such as officers who sign the
registration statement, id. at § 77k(a)(1), and directors, see id. at § 77k(a)(2)-are shielded
from liability for misstatements in the registration statement if they can demonstrate that
"after reasonable investigation, [they had] reasonable ground to believe and did believe,"
that the statements in question were not misleading at the time the registration statement
became effective. Id. at § 77k(b)(3)(A). The statute sets forth somewhat less onerous
requirements for establishing the due diligence defense with respect to statements made on
the authority of experts or official documents. Id. at §§ 77k(b)(3)(C), (D). In point of fact,
officers and directors subject to section 11 cannot escape personal liability by having their
attorneys conduct a due diligence inquiry on their behalf. See Escott v. BarChris Constr.
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 685-86, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). However, if they are unable or
unwilling to conduct the inquiry themselves, they are likely to have attorneys examine the
registration statement to identify potential problems.
30 We henceforth use this term to refer generically to the attorney's role in assuring the
accuracy of disclosure documents, without regard to the applicability of section 11 of the
1933 Act. Such investigations might involve a review of items like the company's basic
chartering documents, the minutes of its board of directors' meetings, and its major
contracts and agreements such as pension plans, profit sharing agreements, executive
compensation agreements, supplier contracts, and credit arrangements; a check of the
company's standing with regulatory officials; and, when necessary, meetings with the
client's bankers and accountants.
31 MCCORMICK, supra note 26, at § 72. Attorneys are also subject to an ethical duty
of nondisclosure. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLrrY Canon 4 (1986).
32 See text accompanying notes 23-24. Among other reasons, audits necessarily rely on
sampling, and by its nature a sampling process will systematically reveal only relatively
pervasive errors or fraud. Nonetheless, it may be possible and desirable in limited
circumstances to design an audit to ferret out specific errors.
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pursue zealously the interests of the client,33 but in practice might well be more
"adversarial" towards the client than is the accountant. For example, in
federally regulated public offerings in which the officers and directors of the
filing company have effectively entrusted their due diligence responsibilities to
attorneys, the corporate principals stand essentially as statutory guarantors
against undetected misrepresentations in the filed documents. 34 Prudence may
thus require a careful attorney actively to seek out errors or fraud in areas
where accountants ordinarily may not.
In the end, however, these differences probably will not impress third-
party users of documents prepared or examined by attorneys. 35 Users of these
documents may rely on the attorney's investigation-or the attorney's care in
preparing the documents-to the same extent that they rely on the accountant's
certification of financial statements. When the documents or reports contain
inaccuracies that are plausibly the result of an attorney's negligence, parties
who suffer losses are likely to view the responsible attorney as an attractive
defendant-especially when the more obvious defendants are judgment proof.36
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PROFESSIONAL THIRD-PARTY
LIABILITY
As Part I illustrates, many of the common tasks performed by accountants
and attorneys in financial transactions can expose practitioners to third-party
allegations of negligent misrepresentation. Moreover, the transactional roles of
accountants and attorneys are in many ways very similar, especially when
viewed from the perspective of third parties. Nonetheless, the courts that have
addressed third-party claims of negligent misrepresentation have not always
treated the two professions similarly. A review of the relevant case law
demonstrates that courts have generally been quite reluctant to apply to
attorneys the expansive theories of liability that are increasingly being applied
3 3 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1986).
34 See supra note 29.
35 See Note, Attorneys' Negligence and 77drd Parties, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 126, 137
(1982).
36
Most often an accounting (or law] firm is sued when one of its clients goes broke.
By that point the lined-up creditors at the bankruptcy court are like the customers at a
[communist] meat store; even for those at the front of the line, the pickings are slim.
Any individual officers who mismanaged or looted the company are likely to be off the
scene or assetless.
Lawson & Olsen, supra note 13, at 34.
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to accountants. 37 The remainder of Part II describes this phenomenon; Part III
examines the reasons behind it and speculates on its likely durability.
Several notes on methodology are appropriate here. First, in order to
assure a comparison of apples to apples, this study is formally limited to
published opinions in which courts dealing with third-party claims against
accountants or attorneys directly address the tort of negligent
misrepresentation. Decisions involving other claims are noted, if at all, only in
passing, even if they purport to announce general liability standards.
Accordingly, this study is not intended to be an authoritative account of the law
of professional third-party liability, or even an authoritative account of the law
of professional third-party liability for negligent misrepresentation. 38 Its
purposes, rather, are to illustrate as starkly as possible the different treatment
sometimes given to attorneys and accountants in seemingly identical cases and
to isolate a context in which the reasons for this different treatment can be
examined.39 Second, we only analyze cases decided during or after 1968,
which seems to mark the beginning of the modem era of expanded professional
liability. This restriction no doubt causes a significant understatement of the
vitality of traditional privity rules, as jurisdictions still governed by pre-1968
cases adopting a privity standard are not encompassed. Finally, while we write
as though our post-1968 sample of cases involving third-party claims of
negligent misrepresentation is all-inclusive, we are humble enough to
acknowledge that this is a hopeless pretension.
A. Trends in Accountants' Liability
Courts currently choose from four different theories when determining the
scope of an accountant's liability for negligent misrepresentation: a theory
requiring the plaintiff to prove privity of contract or an equivalent relationship
37 See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
38 Courts do not appear to distinguish between claims of negligent misrepresentation
and other potential third-party claims, nor is there any obvious reason why they should do
SO.
39 Our informal examination of a broader sample of cases suggests that the third-party
negligent misrepresentation cases are in fact reasonably representative of third-party cases
generally. Our failure to consider jurisdictions that depart from the privity rule in cases
involving torts other than negligent misrepresentation, see, e.g., Collins v. Binkley, 750
S.W.2d 737, 738-39 (Tenn. 1988) (suggesting a general departure from the privity rule in
cases involving attorneys), is largely offset by our failure to consider jurisdictions that have
endorsed the privity rule in similar contexts. See, e.g., Copenhaver v. Rogers, 238 Va.
361, 366-71, 384 S.E.2d 593, 595-98 (1989) (refusing to recognize attorney liability even
to beneficiaries of wills for negligent drafting). Any remaining bias in favor of privity rules
appears to be offset by the temporal distortions discussed below. More significantly, use of
a broader sample of cases would not alter our account of the reasons given by courts for
departing from or retaining traditional privity rules.
1318 [Vol. 52:1309
NEGLIGENTMISREPRESENTATION
between himself and the accountant; an approach based on section 552 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts,40 which permits suit by members of a specific
class of persons who the accountant knows will rely on the audit opinion or
other document; a less focused approach that balances a variety of factors
representing both contract and tort principles; and a theory imposing liability
on the accountant to any foreseeable parties who rely on the accountant's work
product. The law presently exhibits a noticeable, though nonuniform, trend
away from the privity rule and towards more expansive theories of liability.
The 1931 opinion by Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo of the New York
Court of Appeals in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co. 41 is the leading
decision setting forth the rule that accountants are liable for negligence only to
those persons with whom they are in privity. 42 Specifically, the opinion
required the plaintiff to establish either privity of contract or "[a] bond.., so
close as to approach that of privity." 43 For the purposes of this Article's
analysis, privity includes third-party beneficiary relationships. 44 The theory
sounds in contract rather than tort: the accountant's duty results from the
contractual relationship between the parties, and the potential scope of liability
is thus entirely within the accountant's control. This approach dominated the
law for many years, and eight or nine jurisdictions45 have affirmed or
reaffirmed their adherence to it in the past two decades. 46
40 See infra note 48.
41 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
42 The rule was applied as early as 1919. See Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107
A. 783 (1919).
43 Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 446.
44 Some commentators treat cases involving third-party beneficiaries as exceptions to a
privity rule. See Hilliker, supra note 11, at 61 n.145; Note, supra note 13, at 11-14; Note,
supra note 2, at 328-29; Note, supra note 35, at 138-40. Because privity doctrines evolved
before third-party beneficiary theory became a settled feature of contract law, this approach
has historical justification. Functionally, however, once the idea of contract enforcement by
third-party beneficiaries is accepted, there is little reason not to incorporate such third
parties into the chain of privity.
45 With some hesitation, we treat federal courts applying state law as authoritative
sources of that state's law.
46 See Stephens Industries, Inc. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357, 359-60 (10th Cir.
1971) (applying Colorado law); Toro Co. v. Krouse, Kern & Co., 644 F. Supp. 986, 994
(N.D. Ind. 1986), aff'd, 827 F.2d 155, 159-62 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying Indiana law);
Robertson v. White, 633 F. Supp. 954, 970-71 (W.D. Ark. 1986) (applying Arkansas law);
Colonial Bank v. Ridley & Schweigert, 551 So. 2d 390, 395 (Ala. 1989); Idaho Bank Co.
& Trust v. First BanCorp., 115 Idaho 1082, 1084, 772 P.2d 720, 722-23 (1989); Thayer v.
Hicks, 243 Mont. 138, 148, 793 P.2d 784, 791 (1990) (adopting what might be called a
modified privity rule, which imposes liability "if the accountant actually knows that a
specific third party intends to rely upon his work product and only if the reliance is in
connection with a particular transaction or transactions of which the accountant is aware
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The Restatement approach, first set forth in 1968 by a federal district court
in Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin,47 broadens the privity rule in a subtle but
important respect. Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that
accountants who provide audit reports or other financial information to a client
owe a duty of care not only to the client, but also to "the person or one of a
limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance [the accountant]
intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply
it." 48 Under this approach, the accountant can be liable for negligence to any
member of a particular class of individuals who the accountant knows will be
using her work product, while under the privity rule, the accountant can be
liable only to specifically identified individuals who both the accountant and the
client intend to be beneficiaries of the principal contract. 49 Although one
commentator has persuasively argued that the Restatement approach can be
characterized as merely an application of the modem law of third-party
beneficiary contracts, 50 the approach interjects a modest tort element into the
analysis by permitting liability to run to persons the accountant knows will be
given the work product but who the accountant does not, in fact, intend to
benefit. In the more than two decades since Rusch Factors was decided, at least
sixteen jurisdictions have adopted some version of the Restatement approach. 51
when he prepares the work product"); Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Kennedy & Coe, 232 Neb.
477, 479-80, 441 N.W.2d 180, 182 (1989); Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 553, 483 N.E.2d 110, 118, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435, 443 (1985); cf.
Brumley v. Touche, Ross & Co., 123 Ill. App. 3d 636, 638-43, 463 N.E.2d 195, 198-200
(1984) (seeming to endorse both the Restatement test and a third-party beneficiary theory).
47 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968).
48 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(a) (1977). Section 552 reads in
relevant part:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss
caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise
reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3) the liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited to
loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to
supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to
influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transaction.
49 See Gossman, supra note 13, at 218; Hagen, Accountants' Convnon Law Negligence
Liability to Third Parties, 1988 COLUM. BUs. L. REv. 181, 199.
50 See Gossman, supra note 13, at 220-21.
51 See First Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Monco Agency, 911 F.2d 1053, 1060-61 (5th
Cir. 1990) (applying Louisiana law); Ingram Industries v. Nowicki, 527 F. Supp. 683, 684
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In Aluma Kraft Manufacturing Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co.,52 the Missouri
Court of Appeals employed a "balancing of factors" test53 to hold an
accountant liable to known third parties for whose benefit and guidance the
accountant supplied the information.54 While liability could have been imposed
in Aluma Kraft under the Restatement approach, and conceivably even under a
privity standard, 55 the court instead spelled out a number of factors to be
considered in determining liability: "(1) the extent to which the transaction was
intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to him; (3) the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; and (4) the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered." 56 The last
three factors are traditional elements of a tort analysis. The first, focusing on
the intentions of the accountant and client, draws on contract principles. A
(E.D. Ky. 1981) (applying Kentucky law); Rusch Factors, 284 F. Supp. at 90-93 (applying
Rhode Island law); First Fla. Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9, 12-16 (Fla.
1990); Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 257 Ga. 131, 132-33, 356 S.E.2d 198, 199-200 (1987);
Pahre v. Auditor of the State, 422 N.W.2d 178, 179-82 (Iowa 1988); Law Offices of
Lawrence J. Stockler v. Rose, 436 N.W.2d 70, 81-82, 174 Mich. App. 14, 34-37 (1989)
(adopting the Restatenent test as the minimum standard of liability and specifically
reserving judgment on adoption of a broader standard), appeal denied, 434 Mich. 862
(1990); Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 121, 248 N.W.2d 291, 298-303 (1976);
Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 122 N.H. 898, 902-06, 451 A.2d 1308, 1310-13
(1982); Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 322 N.C. 200, 211-15, 367
S.E.2d 609, 615-18 (1988); Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 70 Ohio St. 2d
154, 155-57, 436 N.E.2d 212, 214-15 (1982); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney,
No. 861 (Tenn. App. Nov. 21, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Tenn. file), appeal granted,
(Tenn. May 14, 1990) (LEXIS, States library, Tenn. file); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v.
James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 876-80 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971); Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529
P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974); First Nat'l Bank v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310, 313 (W. Va.
1989); cf Brumley v. Touche, Ross & Co., 123 Ill. App. 3d 636, 638-43, 463 N.E.2d
195, 198-201 (1984) (seeming to endorse both the Restatement test and a third-party
beneficiary theory). Kansas has adopted what amounts to the Restatement rule by statute.
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1-402 (Supp. 1990).
52 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. 1973).
53 The test was first described in a California case holding a notary public liable to an
intended beneficiary of a will for failing to obtain the proper attestation. Biakanja v. Irving,
49 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958). The California courts later applied the same
test to an attorney under similar circumstances. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 588-91,
364 P.2d 685, 687-89, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 823-25 (1961) (holding an attorney liable to an
intended beneficiary of a negligently prepared will), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
Although Lucas did not directly invoke a third-party beneficiary analysis, its conclusion is
not necessarily inconsistent with our understanding of a privity approach.
54 493 S.W.2d at 381-83; see also Lindner Fund v. Abney, 770 S.W.2d 437, 438
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (reaffirming Aumia Kraft).
55 Gossman, supra note 13, at 221.
56 493 S.W.2d at 383.
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"balancing" analysis in which the first factor predominates will not differ
significantly from a privity approach; if the accountant, in fact, intended to
benefit the plaintiff, then the latter might well qualify as a third-party
beneficiary under applicable contract law.
In recent years, four states have dramatically extended the accountant's
liability to all persons the accountant reasonably should have foreseen might
obtain and rely on her reports. 57 This theory represents an almost complete
movement from contract to tort principles. 58 The class of potential plaintiffs
could conceivably extend as far as the general investing public; it is not limited
by either the accountant's knowledge of the use of the product by third parties
or the absence of an intention to benefit them. 59
In all, thirty jurisdictions have directly addressed the issue of an
accountant's liability to third parties for negligent misrepresentation since 1968.
Of those, at least twenty-one, and possibly twenty-two, 60 have to some degree
extended liability beyond even a loosely defined chain of privity that includes
third-party beneficiaries, and at least four have clearly done so in substantial
measure.
B. Trends in Attorneys' Liability
Modern courts have analyzed claims of negligent misrepresentation against
attorneys in terms of the same four tests applied to similar claims against
accountants. They have, however, adopted the various tests in very different
proportions in cases involving the two professions.
The privity rule for attorneys' liability is followed in at least nine states-a
clear majority of the jurisdictions that have directly spoken to the question in
recent years. 61 Significantly, the privity standard for attorneys is applied even
57 See International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal.
App. 3d 806, 810-20, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 220-27 (1986); Touche Ross Co. v.
Commercial Union Ins., 514 So. 2d 315, 318-23 (Miss. 1987) (relying heavily on a state
statute); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 334-53, 461 A.2d 138, 142-53 (1983);
Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 382-87, 335 N.W.2d 361,
364-66 (1983).
58 The movement is less than complete in New Jersey, which permits accountants to
avoid liability by limiting distribution of their documents. See Adler, 93 NJ. at 352-53, 461
A.2d at 153 (dictum); Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1298-99 (D.N.J. 1989) (so
construing Adler).
59 This is evidently not true in New Jersey. See Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1298.
60 Illinois is difficult to categorize. See supra notes 46, 51.
61 See Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1131-33 (5th Cir. 1988) (applying
Louisiana law), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 918 (1989); Ackerman v. Schwartz, 733 F. Supp.
1231, 1241-43 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (applying Indiana law), appeal dismissed, 922 F.2d 843
(7th Cir. 1991); Moss v. Zafiris, 524 So. 2d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 1988); Flaherty v. Weinberg,
303 Md. 116, 130-32, 492 A.2d 618, 625-26 (1985); Robertson v. Gaston Snow & Ely
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in some jurisdictions that subject accountants to more expansive standards of
liability. 62 The most dramatic example is Wisconsin, which follows the privity
rule for attorneys63 and the broad foreseeability standard for accountants. 64
The Restatement test is by far the most popular standard among modem
courts addressing the third-party liability of accountants for negligent
misrepresentation. However, only one decision-rendered by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals applying Pennsylvania law65-appears specifically and
unambiguously to have adopted the Restatement test for similar claims against
attorneys. 66 A second decision, Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin &
Robb, 67 might also fall into this category. In Garcia, the New Mexico Supreme
Bartlett, 404 Mass. 515, 522, 536 N.E.2d 344, 348 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 894
(1989); Schuler v. Meschke, 435 N.W.2d 156, 162-63 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Council
Commerce Corp. v. Schwartz, Sachs & Kamhi, 144 A.D.2d 422, 424, 534 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2
(1988), appeal denied, 74 N.Y.2d 606, 543 N.E.2d 85, 544 N.Y.S.2d 820 (1989); First
Mun. Leasing v. Blankenship, Potts, Aikman, Hagin & Stewart, 648 S.W.2d 410, 413
(Tex. Ct. App. 1983); Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 319-31, 401
N.W.2d 816, 822-27 (1987). Illinois' and Nebraska's endorsements of the privity rule,
while not meeting the strict standards of our survey, are too forceful to escape notice. See
McLane v. Russell, 131 Ill. 2d 509, 514-17, 546 N.E.2d 499, 501-02 (1989); Citizens Nat'l
Bank v. Kennedy & Coe, 232 Neb. 477, 480, 441 N.W.2d 180, 182 (1989); cf Kirby v.
Chester, 174 Ga. App. 881, 884-86, 331 S.E.2d 915, 918-20 (1985) (finding an attorney
liable under third-party beneficiary theory, but suggesting, perhaps unintentionally, that
mere knowledge on the part of an attorney that a third party will rely on his opinion is
sufficient to generate liability).
62 Compare Abell, 858 F.2d at 1131-33; Moss, 524 So. 2d at 1011; Schuler, 435
N.W.2d at 162-63; and First Mun. Leasing, 648 S.W.2d at 413 (applying a privity rule for
attorney liability in, respectively, Louisiana, Florida, Minnesota, and Texas), with First
Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Monco Agency, 911 F.2d at 1060-61; First Fla. Bank v. Max
Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d at 12-16 (Fla. 1990); Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 119-
31, 248 N.W.2d at 298-303; Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d at 876-80
(Tex. Ct. App. 1971) (applying the Restatement test for accountant liability in the same four
states).
63 See Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d at 319-31, 401 N.W.2d at 822-27. The decision in
Kersten was expressly limited to its facts, id. at 330-31, 401 N.W.2d at 826-27, but this
was clearly done in order to distinguish it from decisions in which attorneys were held liable
to nondlients who were in essence third-party beneficiaries. Id. at 321-30, 401 N.W.2d at
823-26; see also Rendler v. Markos, 154 Wis. 2d 420, 426-27, 453 N.W.2d 202, 204-05
(Ct. App. 1990) (reaffirming the privity rule for lawyers).
64 See Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 382-87, 335
N.W.2d 361, 364-66 (1983).
65 See Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 779-80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nor.
Waserstrom v. Eisenberg, 474 U.S. 946 (1985).
66 At least one decision outside the scope of our survey has suggested that the
Restatement test is generally applicable to third-party claims against attorneys. Collins v.
Binkley, 750 S.W.2d 737, 738-39 (Tenn. 1988).
67 106 N.M. 757, 750 P.2d 118 (1988).
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Court invoked the Restatement while claiming to reject a privity standard. With
no apparent sense of irony, however, the court found the Restatement test
inapplicable because the attorney owed no duty of care to third-party
plaintiffs. 68 Thus, the governing standard in New Mexico is perhaps best
described as the Restatement in name but privity in fact.
California courts balance a number of factors when evaluating third-party
claims of negligent misrepresentation against attorneys, which on occasion has
led to holdings that a nonclient has a cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation against an attorney.69 As with the balancing test adopted for
accountants by Missouri courts, 70 it is not clear how far this test departs in fact
as well as theory from a privity standard.
Only one jurisdiction, Oklahoma, clearly appears to hold attorneys liable to
all reasonably foreseeable persons who rely on the attorneys' negligent
misrepresentations. 71 Even though the case that established such liability
involved a known, limited class of plaintiffs, and liability was thus consistent
with the less dramatic Restatement test,72 the opinion treated the question as
one of general tort law, to which it applied the jurisdiction's ordinary
foreseeability standards of negligence liability.73
All told, of the fourteen jurisdictions explicitly to consider third-party
attorney liability for negligent misrepresentation since 1968, at least nine, and
possibly eleven, 74 or approximately seventy percent, have retained the privity
68 Id. at 760-62, 750 P.2d at 121-23; cf. Holland v. Lawless, 95 N.M. 490, 496-97,
623 P.2d 1004, 1011 (Ct. App. 1981) (seemingly adopting the Restatement test).
69 Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 110-11, 128
Cal. Rptr. 901, 905-06 (1976); see also Cicone v. URS Corp., 183 Cal. App. 3d 194, 207-
11, 227 Cal. Rptr. 887, 895-97 (1986) (following Roberts). At least three jurisdictions have
indicated in other contexts that this approach is generally applicable to third-party claims
against attorneys. See Franko v. Mitchell, 158 Ariz. 391, 397-402, 762 P.2d 1345, 1352-
56 (Ct. App. 1988); Pizel v. Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42, 50-51 (1990); Jenkins v. Wheeler, 69
N.C. App. 140, 143, 316 S.E.2d 354, 356-57, review denied, 311 N.C. 758, 321 S.E.2d
136 (1984).
70 See text accompanying notes 48-51.
71 Bradford Sec. Processing Servs. v. Plaza Bank and Trust, 653 P.2d 188, 190 (Okla.
1982). Cf. City Nat'l Bank v. Rodgers & Morgenstein, 155 Mich. App. 318, 323-25, 399
N.W.2d 505, 507-08 (1986) (suggesting in dicta that lawyers are liable to foreseeable third-
party plaintiffs for negligent misstatements of fact but not for negligently offered opinions),
appeal denied, 428 Mich. 885 (1987); Zendell v. Newport Oil Corp., 226 N.J. Super. 431,
438-39, 544 A.2d 878, 881-82 (App. Div. 1988) (suggesting that the foreseeability rule of
Adler applies generally to attorneys as well as accountants).
72 See Bradford, 653 P.2d at 189.
73 Id. at 190-91; see Vanguard Prod., Inc. v. Martin, 894 F.2d 375, 377-79 (10th
Cir. 1990) (applying a broad interpretation of Bradford).
74 Georgia and New Mexico are difficult to describe. See supra note 61 & text
accompanying notes 67-68.
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standard. In contrast, only thirty percent of the jurisdictions that have
considered the issue since 1968 have retained the privity rule in cases involving
accountants.
IL. DIFFERENT STANDARDS FOR ATTORNEYS AND ACCOUNTANTS:
WHERE IT CAME FROM AND WHERE IT Is GOING
There is reason to believe that the pattern of liability sketched out in Part II
will change in the near future-in a way that will please neither most
accountants nor most attorneys. As the rest of this discussion will reveal, the
evidence for this prediction is admittedly spotty; the reasoning of the opinions
catalogued in Part II is frequently terse or unintelligible, and extrapolation from
those opinions is thus a treacherous enterprise.75 Nonetheless, a close look at
the reasons typically given by courts for departing from the privity standard
suggests that attorneys may soon have considerable cause for concern.
A. Mhy Extend Liability?
The courts that have extended professional liability beyond the chain of
privity have offered-albeit usually without explanation or analysis-a welter of
reasons for doing so.76 Those reasons can usefully be grouped into three
categories.
First, a substantial percentage of the cases rely heavily, if not exclusively,
on what can broadly be called doctrinal considerations. These considerations
take the form either of applications of precedents or of attempts to weave
professional third-party liability into a wider legal fabric. The most
straightforward application of precedent was Milliner v. Elmer Fox & CO. 7 7 In
Milliner, the Utah Supreme Court justified adopting the Restatement test for
accountants solely by referring to similar cases in other jurisdictions involving
75 We are also assuming that the reasons given in court decisions are tolerably accurate
reflections of the actual judicial process. We are sensitive to the problems with this
assumption (especially given the role of law clerks in the production of modern judicial
opinions), but we are unpersuaded that any alternative assumptions are likely to generate
better descriptions or predictions.
76 Several cases quite simply offer nothing recognizable as reasons for their decisions.
See Ingrain Indus. v. Nowicki, 527 F. Supp. 683, 684 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (adopting, without
discussion, the Restatement test as Kentucky law for accountants' liability); Bonhiver v.
Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 119-31, 248 N.W.2d 291, 298-303 (1976) (adopting, without
explanation, the Restatement test as Minnesota law for accountants' liability).
77 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974).
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precisely the issue of accountants' liability to third parties for negligent
misrepresentation. 78
Five other decisions have relied on less direct precedents involving
professionals other than accountants or attorneys. In Badische Corp. v.
Caylor,79 the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that the question of an accountant's
third-party liability for negligent misrepresentation was "controlled" 80 by a
prior holding adopting the Restatement test as the measure of third-party
professional liability in the context of an "engineer who issues a report on the
condition of a building."81 Similarly, in First National Bank of Commerce v.
Monco Agency, Inc.,82 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Louisiana
law, noted that Louisiana courts have generally "shaped the dimensions of this
tort [of negligent misrepresentation] by consulting the definition adopted by the
Restatement," 83 and found "no reason to presume that Louisiana would treat
the accounting profession differently." 84 The Oklahoma Supreme Court in
Bradford Securities Processing Services, Inc. v. Plaza Bank & Trust,85 applied
a foreseeability test to a suit for negligent misrepresentation by a purchaser of
bonds86 against the issuer's attorney, on the ground that the case was controlled
by a prior decision permitting a homeowner to bring suit for negligence against
an architect who was employed by the homeowner's contractor.8 7 In Bethlehem
78 Id. at 808; see also Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 257 Ga. 131, 133 n.2, 356 S.E.2d
198, 200 n.2 (1987) (noting the widespread adoption of the Restatement test for
accountants); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 877-78 (Tex. Ct. App.
1971) (adopting the Restatement test for accountants in part on the authority of Rusch
Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968)).
79 257 Ga. 131, 356 S.E.2d 198 (1987).
80 Id. at 132, 356 S.E.2d at 199.
81 Robert & Co. v. Rhodes-Haverty Partnership, 250 Ga. 680, 300 S.E.2d 503 (1983);
cf. Franko v. Mitchell, 158 Ariz. 391, 398-402, 762 P.2d 1345, 1352-56 (Ct. App. 1988)
(applying a balancing test to a third-party malpractice claim against an attorney, largely on
the basis of a state supreme court decision applying a balancing test to a third-party claim
against an architect).
82 911 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1990).
83 Id. at 1060.
84 Id. at 1061.
85 653 P.2d 188 (Okla. 1982).
86 Actually, the plaintiff was a pledgee foreclosing on bonds purchased by the pledgor.
The distinction between a real purchaser and a forced purchaser like a foreclosing pledgee
would seem to be relevant only insofar as forced purchasers may have difficulty proving
that they relied on whatever misrepresentations are alleged to have occurred. The certified
question in Bradford Securities, 653 P.2d at 189, assumed away the reliance problem.
87 Id. at 190-91 (relying on Keel v. Titan Construction, 639 P.2d 1228, 1231-32
(Okla. 1982)). In point of fact, the homeowner in Keel was held to be a third-party
beneficiary of the contract between the contractor and architect, id. at 1231, but that
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Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney,88 the Tennessee Court of Appeals adopted a
different test but used the same doctrinal justification, applying the Restatement
test for accountants largely on the strength of prior decisions applying the
Restatement to other professionals.89 Finally, in First National Bank v.
Crawford,90 the West Virginia Supreme Court explained that its Restatement
test for accountants "is not a commercially unreasonable rule, nor is it any
different from that applied to other professions who issue opinions or
reports." 9 1
Also using precedent, but in a slightly different way, the California Court
of Appeal in Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwiz92 relied on cases
involving the same profession but different torts. The court invoked a balancing
test to permit a partnership's creditor to bring a third-party claim for negligent
misrepresentation against the partnership's attorney.93 Apart from a passing
reference to an obviously inapplicable provision of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts,94 the court relied entirely on prior California decisions. Two cases
permitted third-party suits against attorneys by intended beneficiaries of wills, 95
and another allowed a suit by the client of a collection agency whose attorney
negligently failed to recover a collectible account. 96
holding did not appear to affect the court's discussion of the homeowner's tort action against
the architect.
88 No. 861 (Tenn. App. Nov. 21, 1989), appeal granted, (enn. May 14, 1990)
(LEXIS, States library, Tenn. file).
89 Id.
90 386 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1989).
91 Id. at 313; see also First Fla. Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9, 13-14
(Fla. 1990) (adopting the Restatement test for accountants) (citing A.R. Moyer, Inc. v.
Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 402 (Fla. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 458 So. 2d 766 (Fla.
1984) (modifying the privity rule for architects); First Am. Title Ins. v. First Title Serv.,
457 So. 2d 467, 472-73 (Fla. 1984) (modifying the privity rule for title abstracters)).
92 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1976).
93 Id. at 110-11, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06.
94 The court cited section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which suggests
that a person
who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which
he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is
subject to liability to the third person [under certain circumstances] for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965) (emphasis added); see 57 Cal. App. 3d
at 110-11, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 906. Of course, the typical action for negligent
misrepresentation involves only financial harm.
95 See Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969); Lucas
v. Harmm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961).
96 See Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal. App. 3d 769, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1971).
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In perhaps the strangest use of precedent to date, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Eisenberg v. Gagnon,97 held that Pennsylvania law required
application of the Restatement test to attorneys98 solely on the basis of prior
Pennsylvania decisions applying section 552 of the Restatement to
nonprofessionals. 99 Significantly, all three of the cases that unambiguously
reject the privity standard for attorney-defendants in negligent
misrepresentation suits relied entirely on one of these arguments from
precedent.100
In a different doctrinal vein, a comparable number of courts addressing
accountants' liability have viewed rejection of the privity rule as a logical
consequence of a wider movement away from privity.101 Several courts have
expressed this idea by stating that there is no apparent reason not to impose
third-party liability on accountants. The clear implication of that reasoning is
that privity is a legal aberration that must be affirmatively justified. 102
A second group of cases-overlapping to some extent with the "doctrinal"
cases, but dealing exclusively with accountant's liability-invoke what might be
called enterprise liability arguments: a series of policy concerns that have
become something of a litany in modem decisions expanding the liability of
manufacturers for defective products.103 These cases maintain that
abandonment of privity is necessary as a deterrent to encourage accountants to
97 766 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985).
9 8 Id. at 778.
99 See Rempel v. Nationwide Life Ins., 471 Pa. 404, 408, 370 A.2d 366, 367-68
(1977) (applying the Restatement to a first-party suit); Mill-Mar, Inc. v. Statham, 278 Pa.
Super. 296, 299-300, 420 A.2d 548, 550-51 (1980) (applying the Restatement to a third-
party suit against a nonprofessional land developer) (dictum), appeal dismissed, 499 Pa.
219, 452 A.2d 1017 (1982); Muntan v. City of Monongahela, 45 Pa. Commw. 23, 27 n.3,
406 A.2d 811, 813 n.3 (1979) (endorsing use of the Restatement to impose liability on a city
for negligent misrepresentations by its employees).
100 See Eisenberg, 766 F.2d at 778; Roberts, 57 Cal. App. 3d at 110-11, 128 Cal.
Rptr. at 905-06; Bradford Sec., 653 P.2d at 189-91.
101 See International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal.
App. 3d 806, 812-16, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 221-22 (1986); First Fla. Bank v. Max Mitchell
& Co., 558 So. 2d 9, 13-14 (Fla. 1990); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395, 402 (Iowa
1969); Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378, 381-83 (Mo. App.
1973); Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 122 N.H. 898, 903, 451 A.2d 1308, 1312
(1982); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 335-40, 461 A.2d 138, 145-47 (1983);
Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 877, 879 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971).
102 See International Mortgage, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227;
Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 386-87, 335 N.W.2d 361,
366 (1983).
103 See generally Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Lav, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461,520-21 (1985).
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take an appropriate level of precautions,' 0 4 as a cost-spreading measure to
distribute losses among the accountant's entire client base rather than among a
small number of injured plaintiffs,' 05 or as a fairness measure to shift losses
from innocent investors to guilty accountants.10 6 Perhaps because of their
familiarity from other contexts, these concerns tend to be set forth baldly
without discussion.
Finally, many courts have justified expanded liability for accountants by
referring to the allegedly public role of the modem auditor.107 Ultramares may
have been correctly decided in 1931, they reason, but today the auditor
realistically must be seen as serving more than just the client; the accountant
also serves the third parties who typically rely on her work product. The vision
of the public accountant held by these courts was well expressed by the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,108 when it
declined to recognize a work-product privilege for accountants' papers. The
Court wrote:
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's financial
status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending
any employment relationship with the client. The independent public
accountant performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the
corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public.
This "public watchdog" function demands that the accountant maintain total
independence from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the
public trust. To insulate from disclosure a certified public accountant's
104 See Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.L 1968); International
Mortgage, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227; Adler, 93 N.J. at 351, 461 A.2d
at 152-53; Citizens State Bank, 113 Wis. 2d at 384, 335 N.W.2d at 365; see also Koehler
v. Pulvers, 614 F. Supp. 829, 849 (S.D. Cal. 1985) (invoking "the policy of preventing
future harm" as a reason for holding an attorney liable to a third-party plaintiff under
California law).
105 See Rusch Factors, 284 F. Supp. at 91; International Mortgage, 177 Cal. App. 3d
at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227; Touche Ross v. Commercial Union Ins., 514 So. 2d 315, 322
(Miss. 1987); Spherex, 122 N.H. at 904, 451 A.2d at 1312; Citizens State Bank, 113 Wis.
2d at 384, 335 N.W.2d at 365.
106 See Rusch Factors, 284 F. Supp. at 91; International Mortgage, 177 Cal. App. 3d
at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227; Commercial Union Ins., 514 So. 2d at 322; Spherex, 122
N.H. at 904, 451 A.2d at 1312; Adler, 93 N.J. at 351, 461 A.2d at 152.
107 See International Mortgage, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 819-20, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 224-
27; First F7a. Bank, 558 So. 2d at 15; Law Offices of Lawrence J. Stockier v. Rose, 174
Mich. App. 14, 36, 436 N.W.2d 71, 82 (1989); Spherex, 122 N.H. at 903-04, 451 A.2d at
1311-12; Adler, 93 N.J. at 346-47, 461 A.2d at 149-50; Raritan River Steel Co. v.
Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 322 N.C. 200, 211, 367 S.E.2d 609, 615 (1988); Haddon
View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 70 Ohio St. 2d 154, 157, 436 N.E.2d 212, 214-15
(1982); see supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
108 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
1991] 1329
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
interpretations of the client's financial statements would be to ignore the
significance of the accountant's role as a disinterested analyst charged with
public obligations. 109
Interestingly, strikingly similar sentiments can be found in the ethical code of
the AICPA, which "emphasizes the [accounting] profession's responsibility to
the public, a responsibility that has grown as the number of investors has
grown, as the relationship between corporate managers and stockholders has
become more impersonal, and as government increasingly relies on accounting
information."110 The AICPA's view of its members' professional roles and
responsibilities has not gone unnoticed by courts.1
B. Why Stop There?
While the courts that have chosen to expand professional liability have
been terse in offering explanations for their decisions,112 courts that have
declined to expand liability beyond the chain of privity have been positively
laconic. In the case of jurisdictions that simply affirm or reaffirm the privity
rule for both accountants and attorneys, this lack of explanation is not
surprising; one would hardly expect courts to spend a great deal of time
justifying their adherence to long settled doctrine. The silence is at least mildly
puzzling, however, in jurisdictions where courts have extended liability for
accountants beyond the chain of privity, but maintain the privity rule in suits
brought against attorneys. 113 Among those jurisdictions, 114 the Texas courts
have openly noted the divergence in liability standards and have suggested that
it may not last much longer. 15 Other courts, however, are wholly mute on the
point. 116 It is as though the "accountants' cases" and the "attorneys' cases"
inhabit separate legal worlds.
10 9 Id. at 817-18.
110 OFEsSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 17, at ET § 53.04.
111 See International Mortgage, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 817, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25;
Raritan River Steel, 322 N.C. at 211, 367 S.E.2d at 615.
112 Our procedure of merely listing, without elaboration, the reasons that appear
in court decisions omits nothing of interest.
113 We have found no jurisdiction in which attorneys are clearly held to a broader
standard of liability than accountants.
114 See supra text accompanying notes 51-64.
115 See Blue Bell, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 715 S.W.2d 408, 413 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1986).
116 See First Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Monco Agency, 911 F.2d 1053, 1060-61
(5th Cir. 1990) (federal court applying Louisiana law) (applying the Restdtement test to
accountants without mention of prior cases in the jurisdiction applying a privity rule to
attorneys); First Fla. Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9, 12-16 (Fla. 1990) (same);
Schuler v. Meschke, 435 N.W.2d 156, 162-63 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (applying the privity
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This kind of compartmentalization is familiar in other areas of the law, 117
but the more similar the subject matter and extreme the difference in legal
standards, the more one expects the rules to converge. It is therefore worth
exploring whether the reasons that courts have given-and are likely to give in
the future-for expanding the third-party liability of accountants can logically
be confined to that profession.
1. The Broad-Brush Sweep of Precedent and Enterprise Liability
Courts that justify expanded third-party liability for accountants by
referring to doctrinal considerations will have a difficult time keeping that
expansion from engulfing the legal profession as well. This is particularly true
with respect to jurisdictions that rely on a widespread abandonment of privity
rules or on previous extensions of third-party liability to professionals like
engineers or architects. IIS By their nature, these considerations are general and
on their face apply to attorneys as well as accountants. One could, of course,
justify differential treatment of accountants and attorneys on doctrinal grounds
simply by maintaining that the absence of third-party liability for attorneys is
doctrinally more basic than principles such as erosion of privity or expanded
liability for professionals. That is, one could treat the compartmentalization of
attorneys' cases, and other professionals' cases as a primary element of
doctrine that requires no external justification. Courts may already be
categorizing the cases in this manner, 119 and perhaps a tacit doctrinal
classification of this sort will endure. However, given that all three of the
jurisdictions that have unambiguously expanded attorney liability to third
parties have done so on grounds of precedent 120 and that other jurisdictions
rule to attorneys without mention of the jurisdiction's prior adoption of the Restatement test
for accountants); Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 319-31, 401 N.W.2d
816, 822-27 (1987) (applying a privity rule to attorneys without mention of the
jurisdiction's prior adoption of the foreseeability test for accountants).
117 For example, everyone (we trust) recognizes that "race cases," "abortion cases,"
and "military cases" in constitutional law are worlds unto themselves. For a somewhat more
mundane illustration of compartmentalization, see Scalia, Sovereign Inmnity and
Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some Conclusions from the Public-
Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REv. 867 (1970) (comparing the development of sovereign
immunity doctrine in cases involving public land patents and in other contexts).
118 See supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
119 This might explain their failure to address the evident inconsistency in their
treatment of attorneys and accountants.
120 See supra text accompanying note 100. The decisions in Oklahoma and
Pennsylvania illustrate this point more powerfully than do the decisions in California. The
California court in Roberts relied on prior cases involving attorneys, while the Oklahoma
court in Bradford Securities relied on a prior case involving an architect and the Third
Circuit in Eisenberg relied on cases that did not involve professionals.
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appear ready, and even eager, to expand attorney liability for similar
reasons, 121 there is good reason to assume that the broader doctrinal
formulations still have force. Thus, it is important to ask whether there are any
affirmative reasons likely to be accepted by courts for exempting attorneys
from the expanded liability rules that have increasingly been applied to
accountants in recent years.
No such reasons appear from an examination of the respective transactional
roles of accountants and attomeys.' 22 Perhaps it is ordinarily more reasonable
for third parties to rely on an accountant's formal certification of financial
statements than on an attorney's informal due diligence investigation, but that
affects only the likelihood that the plaintiff will be able to prove his case, 123 not
the appropriateness of a separate legal standard for accountants and attorneys.
Similarly, the fact that disclosures to attorneys, but not to accountants, are
invariably subject to evidentiary privileges may well affect the mechanics of
negligent misrepresentation suits in which confidential client information is part
of the attorney's defense, 124 but it is not clear that an attorney-client
relationship necessitates a different standard of liability. While there does not
appear to be any direct authority concerning disclosure of confidential
information by attorneys in third-party negligent misrepresentation suits,125
there is analogous authority suggesting that such disclosure would-or at least
could-be permissible. 126 If the prospect of disclosure poses a serious danger
121 See supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
122 See supra text accompanying notes 15-36.
123 Reliance is generally an essential element of that case. See supra note 15.
124 The privilege poses no problem when the client (or a client-designated beneficiary)
is the plaintiff because the client can plausibly be said to have waived his privilege by
bringing (or tacitly authorizing) suit. See E. EPSTEIN & M. MARTIN, THE ATrORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 96 (2d ed. 1989); McMonigle,
The Self Defense Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege: Disclosure of the Cient's
Confidences or Personal Liability, in THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE UNDER SIEGE:
PRESERVING AND PROTECTING IT IN CIVIL CASES 278, 279-80 (1989). The waiver
principle obviously does not apply when suit is brought by third parties.
125 See McMonigle, supra note 124, at 288.
126 See First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 110
F.R.D. 557, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); E. EPSTEIN & M. MARTIN, supra note 130, at 96-97;
McMonigle, supra note 130, at 282-90. Ethical rules also recognize the permissibility of
disclosure. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility permits disclosure of client
confidences when it is necessary for the attorney "to defend himself. . . against an
accusation of wrongful conduct." MODEL CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-
101(C)(4) (1986). While it is true that this provision was clearly drawn in contemplation of
"the situation where the client has sued the attorney for. negligence or malpractice," Note,
supra note 2, at 22, its wording is general enough to cover defense of third-party suits. See
also First Fed. Say. & Loan, 110 F.R.D. at 562. The more recent Model Rules of
Professional Conduct avoid any ambiguity by explicitly authorizing disclosure by the
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to the attorney-client relationship, as some have forcefully maintained, 127 it is
possible to handle the problem without prohibiting third-party suits against
attorneys. For example, the court could determine that confidential information
is necessary to the attorney's defense before permitting its disclosure.128 No
other differences between the tasks performed by accountants and attorneys can
even plausibly justify separate treatment of the two professions. There may be
sound normative reasons for retaining the privity rule for attorneys, and the
effect of third-party litigation on the attorney-client relationship may be nothing
but pernicious, but as a descriptive matter, if there is doctrinal pressure on a
court to depart from the privity rule with respect to attorneys, problems such as
confidentiality are unlikely to provide a powerful counterweight.
Jurisdictions that rely, in whole or in part, on enterprise liability arguments
to justify expanded accountants' liability to third parties will find it even more
difficult to justify a separate liability standard for attorneys. To whatever extent
that enterprise liability arguments are persuasive, 129 they apply equally to
accountants and attorneys. If courts believe that accountants will be deterred
from wrongdoing by the prospect of third-party liability, there is no reason for
them not to believe the same of attorneys. 130 Similarly, if courts believe that
the availability of professional insurance makes accountants good risk-
spreaders, the same is true about attorneys, who are no less or more able to
obtain insurance than accountants. Finally, if it is better to impose liability on
negligent accountants than on reasonably relying third parties, there is no
reason within the enterprise-liability framework for reaching a different
conclusion when attorneys are involved.
2. Changing Conceptions of Professional Roles
Outside the enterprise-liability framework, subjecting attorneys to third-
party liability is in troublesome tension with the attorney's ethical obligation
"to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law," 131 and may
seriously distort the traditional attorney-client relationship. How, one might
attorney in defense of claims brought by third parties. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1989); cf. AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 301
(1988) (permitting accountants to reveal confidential client information when necessary to
"respondOl to any inquiry made by a recognized investigative or disciplinary body," but
making no mention of defense against lawsuits).
127 See Crossland Sav. v. Rockwood Ins., 700 F. Supp. 1274, 1282-83 (S.D.N.Y.
1988); Note, supra note 2, at 21-23.
128 See First Fed. Say. & Loan, 110 F.R.D. at 566-68.
129 That extent, in our view, is very small. See Lawson & Olson, supra note 13, at 36,
71-72.
130 See Note, supra note 35, at 130-31.
131 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1986).
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ask, can an attorney give single-minded devotion to the interests of his client if
he must also guard against liability to third parties? 132 This traditional view of
the attorney as the faithful servant of the client, 133 within very broad legal and
ethical boundaries, is the key both to understanding the difference in treatment
currently afforded accountants and attorneys in third-party litigation and to
predicting future trends in attorney liability.
Accountants, no less than attorneys, work for clients. First parties, not
third parties, pay accountants' fees. But while the contractual basis of
accountants' relationships with their clients may have nourished the privity rule
in times past, 134 it does not impress modern courts to the same extent. As
noted earlier, 135 many of these courts declare explicitly-and we suspect many
more hold tacitly-that the widespread fact, or even perception, of third-party
reliance on accountants is itself sufficient justification for discarding privity
rules in negligent misrepresentation cases. The decision of the California Court
of Appeal in International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy
Cgp. 13 6 is illustrative. In adopting the foreseeability standard for third-party
accountant liability, the court maintained that outside audits are "imbued with
considerations of public trust, for the accountant must well realize the finished
product . . . will be relied upon by creditors, stockholders, investors, lenders
or anyone else involved in the financial concerns of the audited client."1 37 In
the same vein, the New Jersey Supreme Court in H. Rosenblwn, Inc. v.
Adler,138 suggested that "[tihe auditor's function has expanded from that of a
watchdog for management to an independent evaluator of the adequacy and
fairness of financial statements issued by management to stockholders,
creditors, and others." 139 Echoing the same litany in Spherex, Inc. v.
Alexander Grant & Co., 140 the New Hampshire Supreme Court declared that
the accountant today "'must accept the burdens of legal responsibility that go
along with the benefits derived from his important role in the modern business
132 See Crossland Savings, 700 F. Supp. at 1282-83.
133 See supra text following note 8.
134 We suspect, though we cannot prove, that the true origin of the privity rule for
accountants lies in the ideology of contract (and we do not use the phrase disparagingly)
rather than in the policy concerns emphasized by Judge Cardozo in Vltrmnares. See supra
notes 42-44. Judge Cardozo's oft-quoted opinion explained that the imposition of a
noncontractual duty could "expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for
an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class" for "a thoughtless slip or blunder, the
failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries." Id. at 179, 174
N.E. at 444.
135 See supra text accompanying note 107.
136 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1986).
137 Id. at 817, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
138 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
139 Id. at 346, 461 A.2d at 149.
140 122 N.H. 898, 451 A.2d 1308 (1982).
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community." 14 1 That is merely a polite way of saying that accountants must
be liable to third parties simply because third parties rely on them. Similarly,
the North Carolina Supreme Court in Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherty,
Bekaert & Holland 42 denigrated the privity rule for accountants because it is
inadequate for the "central role independent accountants play in the financial
world." 143 The court reasoned that "accountants' audit opinions are
increasingly relied upon by the investing and lending public in making financial
decisions .... Because of this heavy public reliance on audited financial
information we believe an approach that protects [relying third parties] is
desirable."144
The unmistakable message of these cases is that, as far as the legal system
is concerned, the accountant serves a far broader clientele than the audit
contract might suggest. Indeed, in this world view, the accountant is less a
servant of the paying client than of these other constituencies, which rely on the
accountant to keep the nominal client honest. It is not surprising that courts
animated by this vision of the accountant find the privity rule unattractive, or
even incomprehensible.
In contrast to this vision, the familiar image of the attorney as the paying
client's faithful servant still seems to loom large in this area of the law and
elsewhere. Courts do not speak of the attorney's primary responsibility to
nonclients in terms comparable to the above-quoted language concerning
accountants.1 45 This may explain why courts apply different standards of third-
party liability to the two professions. Third-party accountant liability is deemed
appropriate because courts consider it reasonable for the public to expect
accountants to serve nonclients. But it is considered to be quite another matter
for the public to expect attorneys to divide their loyalties between clients and
141 122 N.H. at 904, 451 A.2d at 1312 (quoting Mess, Accountants and the Common
Lmv: Liability to 7Thrd Parties, 52 NoTRE DAME LAW. 838, 856 (1977)).
142 322 N.C. 200, 367 S.E.2d 609 (1988).
143 Id. at 211, 367 S.E.2d at 615.
144 Id.; see also First Fla. Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9, 15 (Fla. 1990)
("Because of the heavy reliance upon audited financial statements in the contemporary
financial world, we believe permitting recovery only from those in privity or near privity is
unduly restrictive."); Law Offices of Lawrence J. Stockler v. Rose, 436 N.W.2d 70, 82,
174 Mich. App. 14, 36 (1989) (adopting the Restatenent test "[flor the reasons stated in
Raritan River Steel Co.'); Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 70 Ohio St. 2d
154, 157, 436 N.E.2d 212, 214-15 (1982) (the privity rule "ignores the modern verity that
accountants make reports on which people other than their clients foreseeably
rely .... This being the case, the accountant's duty... extends to any third person to
whom they understand the reports will be shown for business purposes.").
145 Admittedly, they do not speak of the attorney's primary responsibility to his client
either. As we have previously noted, they do not really say much of anything. In this
instance, however, the silence alone is significant, as it is reasonable to assume that the
traditional conception of the lawyer's role retains vitality unless a court indicates otherwise.
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nonclients. Thus, as long as courts hold fast to the image of the attorney as the
client's loyal fiduciary, it is plausible to expect attorneys to continue to receive
relatively favorable treatment in third-party lawsuits.
3. Enter the SEC
The likely durability of the traditional conception of the lawyer's role is a
subject best left to experts on the legal profession. There is, however, a series
of events from the recent past concerning the liability of attorneys under the
federal securities laws that is particularly instructive.
In 1972, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a complaint
in district court alleging numerous violations of the federal securities laws
concerning a merger between National Student Marketing Corporation and
Interstate National Corporation (NSMC). 146 Among the many defendants
named in the complaint were two prominent law firms and several of their
partners. 147 The complaint accused the lawyers of'aiding and abetting a
fraudulent scheme by failing to insist that certain last-minute adjustments to
NSMC's financial statements be disclosed to shareholders of the two merging
companies and public investors. In addition, the SEC charged that the lawyers
should have demanded that shareholders be resolicited after dissemination of
the corrected financial statements. 148 The most noteworthy portion of the
complaint alleged:
As part of the fraudulent scheme [the lawyers] failed to refuse to issue
their opinions [giving the go-ahead to consummation of the merger] and failed
to insist that the financial statements be revised and shareholders be resolicited,
and failing that, to cease representing their respective clients and, under the
circumstances, notify the plaintiff Commission concerning the misleading
nature of the nine month financial statements. 149
The claim, in other words, was that the securities laws required the lawyers to
"rat" on their clients to the SEC. 150
146 See SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,360
(Feb. 3, 1972) [hereinafter NSMC]. The literature on NSMC is voluminous but essentially
irrelevant to this discussion. Those curious about the details of the case can consult the
District Court opinion. NSMC, 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
147 See NSMCat 11 17-18, 24-26.
14 8 See id. at 148.
149 Id. at 48(i).
150 The case's final resolution was anticlimactic. The district court agreed in dicta with
the SEC's finding of liability, but refused to issue an injunction against the lawyers. NSMC,
457 F. Supp. at 712-17.
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Where could the Commission have gotten that notion? Public statements
made by Commission officials shortly after the filing of the NSMC complaint
suggest one possible answer. On January 24, 1974, SEC Commissioner A.A.
Sommer, Jr., delivered a speech to the Banking, Corporation, and Business
Law Section of the New York State Bar Association. 151 The following excerpts
from the speech convey its flavor:
We are consistently reminded that historically the attorney has been an
advocate, that his professional ethics have over the years defined his function
in those terms, that such a role includes unremitting loyalty to the interests of
his client (short of engaging in or countenancing fraud) ....
I would suggest that the security bar's conception of its role too sharply
contrasts with the reality of its role in the securities process to escape notice
and attention-and in such situations the reality eventually prevails ....
We live in the age of the consumer. All of the old articles of faith which
frustrated him in efforts to achieve equity have fallen or are falling .... This
pervading judicial and legislative concern for the interests of the consumer
which has for forty years been present in large measure in the securities field
(the securities laws may have been the first federal consumer legislation) is
affecting and will affect increasingly the securities field-and those involved in
it.
Consequently, I would suggest that all the old verities and truisms about
attorneys and their roles are in question and in jeopardy-and, unless you are
ineradicably dedicated to the preservation of the past, that is not all bad.
I would suggest that in securities matters (other than those where advocacy
is clearly proper) the attorney will have to function in a manner more akin to
that of the auditor than to that of the advocate. This means... he will have to
be acutely cognizant of his responsibility to the public who engage in securities
transactions that would never have come about were it not for his professional
presence. 152
It was not difficult to read these remarks as a declaration that securities
lawyers who prepare disclosure documents should owe a duty of care to the
investing public153-especially because the speech came on the heels of strong
dicta from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals suggesting much the same
thing in the context of attorneys' opinions concerning exemptions from
registration requirements. 154 Significantly, if one believes in such a public
151 See Sommer, 7he Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lanyer, Fed. See. L.
Rep. (CCII) 79,631 (1974).
152 Id.
153 See Lipman, 77Te SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New Role for Lawyers, 49
N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 437-40 (1974).
154 See SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 542 (2d Cir. 1973):
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duty, it is a small logical step to the proposition that attorneys must police their
nominal clients on behalf of the SEC, the public's self-proclaimed
representative.
In 1975, these implications were made explicit in an article by Theodore
Sonde, then Associate Director of the Commission's Division of
Enforcement. 155 In response to some critics who objected to the view of
lawyers as public servants, which they saw implicit in the Commission's
actions and Commissioner Sommer's speech, Sonde did not deny that the
Commission held such a view.156 He denied only that this claimed public duty
would ever conflict with lawyers' private duties to their clients or that the
Commission would in practice prosecute attorneys for mere negligence. 157
More significantly, in the course of drawing a distinction between the lawyer's
functions as advocate and adviser, with the aim of suggesting that the
traditional role conception inadequately described the latter, Sonde cited a
contemporaneous Commission release concerning the public duties of
accountants in a manner that made unmistakably clear his view that securities
lawyers involved in the disclosure process serve the investing public as much
or more than their paying clients:
In the distribution of unregistered securities, the preparation of an opinion letter is too
essential and the reliance of the public too high to permit due diligence to be cast aside
in the name of convenience. The public trust demands more of its legal advisers than
"customary" activities which prove to be careless.
One scholar, writing in 1977, saw this dicta as part of a developing doctrine in the
courts. "It appears ...that the courts, sometimes prodded by the SEC, have begun to
recognize that the duty of a lawyer runs. . . at least in certain circumstances to the public,
[and] that such duty includes a standard of due care." Frank, supra note 28, at 350. We
think that this significantly overstated the case even in 1977, though of course we now have
the benefit of hindsight.
155 Sonde, Professional Responsibility-A New Responsibility or the Old Gospel?, 24
EMORY L.J. 827 (1975).
156 Indeed, he all but endorsed the view that attorneys owe a duty of care to the
investing public when preparing disclosure documents:
Negligence, the absence of reasonable care, is the criterion that governs most if not all
other aspects of liability for human behavior, and it is difficult to see why lawyers and
accountants should be provided with special rules. After all, lawyers and accountants
are liable to their immediate clients and others for negligence in actions brought against
them for malpractice. It seems that the only real question involved is not whether
professionals should properly be held accountable for their negligence, but rather, given
the potential liability that exists in this area, whether the public interest is furthered by
exposing these professionals to that form of liability.
Id. at 851-52 (footnote omitted).
157 See id. at 847-51.
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"Professionals involved in the disclosure process are in a very real sense
representatives of the investing public served by the Commission, and, as a
result, their dealings with the Commission and its staff [and implicitly the
investing public] must be permeated with candor and full disclosure. It cannot
resemble an adversary relationship more appropriate to litigants in court,
because the Commission [as well as the investing public] is not an adverse
party in this context." 158
These were not the first such statements by Commission officials, 159 but they
were the loudest.
The bar did not react kindly to these comments. On August 12, 1975, the
American Bar Association's House of Delegates adopted a resolution and a
committee report specifically responding to the SEC's position that securities
lawyers must police their clients' compliance with federal disclosure laws on
behalf of the public. 160 The resolution insisted that "[t]he confidentiality of
lawyer-client consultations and advice and the fiduciary loyalty of the lawyer to
the client . . . are vital to the basic function of the lawyer as legal
counselor." 161 The ABA also noted that "a lawyer cannot, consistently with his
essential role as legal adviser, be regarded as a source of information
concerning possible wrong-doing by clients." 162 The accompanying report of
158 Id. at 862 (quoting In re Arthur Andersen & Co., Accounting Release No. 157, 4
SEC DOCKEr 547, 550 (July 8, 1974) (bracketed material in original)). Sonde did not
suggest that the Commission or the investing public split the lawyer's fee with the nominal
client. Cf. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURIrIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
1237 (6th ed. 1987) ("Professor Morgan Shipman [of the Ohio State University College of
Law] has asserted that the securities lawyer doesn't really have any client, but is the
attorney to 'the situation.' This has prompted one lawyer to inquire whether he should send
his bill to 'the situation'; and if he did, would the situation pay it?") (footnote omitted). In
fairness to Professor Shipman, it should be noted that he clarified his comments by
observing that "[n]one of this is to say that corporate counsel represents the public at large."
Shipman, The Need for SEC Rulemaking Concerning the Duties and GviI Liabilities of
Attorneys, 30 Bus. LAw. 34, 36 (March 1975).
159 See Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities Lawyers: An
Analysis of the New Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities of Duties, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 412, 425-27 (1974) (collecting pre-NSMC comments on the legal profession by SEC
personnel).
160 See Statement of Policy Adopted by American Bar Association Regarding
Responsibilities and Liabilities of Lawyers in Advising with Respect to the Compliance by
Cients with Laws Administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 31 Bus. LAW.
543 (1975).
161 Id. at 544.
162 Id.
1991] 1339
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the Committee on Counsel Responsibility and Liability of the Section of
Corporation, Banking, and Business Law (CCR) similarly affirmed the "basic
principle that the lawyer's role is essentially that of counselor to his client." 163
The CCR also maintained that the attorney-client relationship
is undermined to the extent that client communications with lawyers are made
with the risk that the lawyer will, if not satisfied with the client's response to
his advice or if concerned over his own potential personal liabilities, report
possible deficiencies to third parties. Accordingly, it has long been recognized
by the Code of Professional Responsibility ... that only in the clearest cases
of illegal or fraudulent activities by a client in the course of the lawyer's
representation should the lawyer be called upon or permitted to take such
action. 164
This clash of role perceptions between the American Bar Association and
the SEC threatened to escalate into total war when, shortly thereafter, the SEC
began seriously wielding its Rule 2(e). 165 Rule 2(e), which many practitioners
and observers viewed as heavy handed and potentially dangerous, 166 purports
to authorize the Commission to regulate persons who practice before it.167 The
mhe lawyer has neither the obligation nor the right to make disclosure when any
reasonable doubt exists concerning the client's obligation of disclosure, i.e., the client's
failure to meet his obligation is not clearly established, except to the extent that the
lawyer should consider appropriate action, as required or permitted by the [Code of
Professional Responsibility], in cases where the lawyer's opinion is expected to be
relied on by third parties and the opinion is discovered to be not correct, whether
because it is based on erroneous information or otherwise.
Id. at 545.
163 Id. at 546.
164 Id. at 547.
165 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1990).
166 See, e.g., Best, In Opposition to Ride 2(e) Proceedings, 36 Bus. LAW. 1815,
1815-17 (1981); Krane, The Attorney Unshackled: SEC Rule 2(e) Violates Clients' Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 50, 89-90 (1981); Marsh, Rule 2(e)
Proceedings, 35 Bus. LAW. 987, 987-93 (1980); Wheat, The Impact of SEC Professional
Responsibility Standards, 34 Bus. LAW. 969, 969-72 (1979).
167 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1) states:
The Commission may deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or
practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the Commission after
notice of and opportunity for hearing in the matter (i) not to possess the requisite
qualifications to represent others, or (ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to have
engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct, or (iii) to have willfully violated,
or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any provision of the Federal securities
laws ... or the rules and regulations thereunder.
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clash, however, ended with a whimper when the SEC indicated that it would
define the ethical standards for its practitioners in very traditional terms 168 and
later seemingly abandoned altogether the enterprise of regulating the legal
profession. 169
4. The Lessons To Be Learned
One can draw several different lessons from the foregoing episode. An
optimistic attorney could point to the ABA's quick and firm reaffirmation of
the traditional conception of the lawyer's role and the SEC's eventual retreat
from its contrary position as signs of the strong vitality of the traditional
conception. Indeed, this forceful response from one of the legal profession's
most important self-regulatory bodies stands in sharp contrast to the AICPA's
hearty embrace of the notion that accountants are, notwithstanding the terms of
their employment contracts, servants of a broader public interest.170
Accountants, the optimistic attorney might conclude, have merely gotten
exactly what they asked for.
We are not optimists. Instead, we see strong evidence of the fragility of the
traditional concept of the attorney's role in the fact that a major federal
regulatory agency seriously believed, for nine years, that it could get away with
such a large scale redefinition of the lawyer's responsibilities. If that is indeed
the appropriate lesson to draw, then the line between the third-party liability of
attorneys and accountants may be much narrower than a simple nose count of
jurisdictions presently suggests. There is no obvious reason why courts should
be expected to be more solicitous of lawyers' interests than is the SEC.
In view of the evident connection between role conception and tort
liability, lawyers might want to think twice before trying to improve their
images with syrupy talk about their service and obligations to the public. The
public might believe them.
168 See In re Carter and Johnson, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC
DOCKEr 292 (Feb. 28, 1981).
169 On September 21, 1981, the Commission requested public comment on a proposed
standard of conduct for professionals, see Standard of Conduct Constituting Unethical or
In proper Professional Practice Before the Commission, Securities Act Release No. 6344, 23
SEC DOCKEr 826 (1981), but it never acted on the proposal.
170 See supra text accompanying note 110.
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